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PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS: A GUIDE FOR REGULATORY
REFORM
ABSTRACT
Proxy advisory firms exist at the nexus of some of the most high-profile
corporate law discussions—most notably, the shareholder voting process,
which has recently been the subject of much scholarly and legal debate. As
proxy advisory firms are used prevalently by institutional investors to aid them
in voting their proxies, it is no surprise that the firms now find themselves the
target of regulatory reform efforts. While proxy advisory firms are frequently
discussed in the news, criticized by boards of directors and corporate law
scholars, and trumpeted by their clients, there is still a significant amount of
misinformation and mischaracterization about their function, use, and
influence. Because the SEC has announced its intentions to regulate the proxy
advisory industry, an informed understanding of proxy advisory firms and their
influence on the shareholder franchise is necessary for the promulgation of
sound and nonreactive regulatory measures.
This Comment parses critics’ concerns with the proxy advisory industry
and reconciles the motivations for regulation with how proxy advisory firms
function and are used. Particularly, this Comment dispels the notion that proxy
advisory firms wield too much influence over institutional investors and
shareholder voting, and it explains that the fears of conflicts of interest are
likely overstated. Utilizing Anthony Downs’s research on the application of
economic theory to democratic voting, this Comment demonstrates that proxy
advisory firms are vital in facilitating the rational, efficient exercise of the
shareholder franchise. In light of these findings, this Comment proposes a
regulatory approach that subjects proxy advisory firms to federal oversight
without imposing unjustified, onerous measures. By using a piecemeal
regulatory approach—centered on amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to require that proxy advisory firms disclose significant
relationships with corporate issuers and providing explicit guidance to
institutional investors regarding their fiduciary duties to vote proxies in their
clients’ best interests—proxy advisory firms can be regulated without
impairing their utility or the ability of their clients to cast informed votes.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, the
subprime mortgage crisis, and the rise of institutional investors, a battle has
broken out over how much power shareholders should have in the corporate
decision-making process. Corporate traditionalists1 have long argued that
vesting power in anyone outside of management is foolish and undermines the
health of publicly traded corporations.2 Despite their objections, corporate
traditionalists are losing this fight; shareholder voting is becoming more
prominent and powerful.3
In response, advocates of the traditional corporate power structure have
initiated a counteroffensive, aiming criticisms at the purported power behind
the shareholder vote: proxy advisory firms.4 Proxy advisory firms are
information-gathering companies hired by institutional investors to issue
voting recommendations regarding everything from executive compensation to
proposed mergers.5 While this service may seem unobjectionable on its face, it
has produced a wave of criticism predicated on the argument that proxy
advisory firms are not mere “researchers” who advise their clients on the best
way to vote, but instead power behind the power—exerting undue influence
over their clients and lacking accountability and adequate monitoring.6
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in keeping with its
newfound ethos of aggressive responses to potential problems, has taken up the
sword on behalf of those who fear the influence and unaccountability of proxy
advisory firms. After publishing the Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy
System (Concept Release), which solicited feedback regarding how proxy
1 The term corporate traditionalist is adopted from a Leo Strine article and is meant to encapsulate the
views of those who prefer the status quo of corporate governance, chiefly the “empowerment of centralized
management,” and reject the arguments in favor of shareholder empowerment. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1763 (2006).
2 See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561 (2006) (challenging the claim that taking power away from directors and giving it to shareholders
will benefit shareholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 601 (2006) (arguing that the director system in the United States serves investors and society well);
Strine, supra note 1.
3 See Anabtawi, supra note 2, at 562.
4 See Letter from Niels Holch, Exec. Dir., S’holder Commc’ns Coal., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Shareholder Communications Coalition Letter],
available at http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/SCCLetter11712.pdf.
5 See id.
6 See infra Part II.
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advisory firms operate and how they should be regulated, the SEC announced
that it would be “considering how to provide guidance” on how to regulate
proxy advisory firms.7 Then-SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro cited a
combination of criticisms concerning potential interference with effective
management-to-shareholder communication, lack of accountability, and the
quality of advisory firm recommendations as the impetus behind the decision.8
Given the recent corporate fraud fiascos and the concerns raised in the
comments to the Concept Release,9 the SEC’s desire to regulate proxy
advisory firms is not unreasonable on its face. However, this Comment argues
that the form of regulation recommended by the SEC in response to the outcry
of corporate traditionalists will be disproportionally severe, and it will stem
from a want of consideration of the important role proxy advisory firms play in
ensuring the rational and efficient exercise of the shareholder franchise. A
regulatory regime for proxy advisory firms that takes into account the utility
and demand for this industry can be achieved.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the importance of shareholder
voting and the rise of the proxy advisory industry. Part II provides an overview
of the movement toward federal regulation of proxy advisory firms and
describes the proposed regulatory frameworks that have been offered by the
SEC and others. Part III explores the two most prominent criticisms of proxy
advisory firms and discusses why these criticisms are overstated in
consideration of recent studies and evidence showing that many institutional
investors do not rely solely on one firm’s recommendation. Part IV provides a
detailed analysis of the utility of proxy advisory firms. In particular, this
analysis applies the theoretical framework of Anthony Downs to shareholder
voting and proves that proxy advisory firms are not only efficient, but also
vitally important to the rational exercise of the shareholder franchise. Finally,
Part V discusses the SEC’s recent trend toward overregulation and the cost
associated therewith, and it proposes regulatory frameworks that can
effectively and responsibly deal with the rational concerns regarding the proxy
advisory industry.

7 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate
Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance
Dialogue], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch121511mls.htm.
8 Id.
9 See supra Part II.
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I. THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
This Part provides an overview of the rise of shareholder voting and proxy
advisory firms. While the issue of expanded shareholder voting falls outside
the scope of this Comment, an understanding of the increasing importance of
shareholder voting is crucial to an understanding of proxy advisory firms. This
Part discusses, first, the recent trend of shareholder empowerment and, second,
an overview of proxy advisory firms and the role they play in corporate
governance.
A. The Importance of Shareholder Voting
According to its proponents, shareholder voting is the traditional lynchpin
that both legitimizes the theoretical foundations of the modern corporate
structure10 and provides adequate avenues of oversight to enable shareholders
to protect their interests.11 In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., the
Delaware Chancery Court emphasized the importance of the shareholder
franchise and noted that, absent selling the stock they own, the only protection
shareholders have against subpar corporate performance is the ability to vote
out incumbent directors.12 According to Professor Lucian Bebchuk, this means
of control is paramount, as the interests of directors are not necessarily the
same as those of shareholders.13 Directors do not own the property they
control, and therefore they may subordinate the interests of ownership (held by
shareholders) in favor of their own.14
While the importance of shareholder voting is hardly universally
accepted,15 it is incontrovertible that recent trends favor promoting the
shareholder franchise. For instance, there has been a shift among U.S.

10 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
11 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Shareholder Rights and the DGCL, DEL. LAW., Spring 2008, at 16, 16 (“The
shareholder franchise is a key mechanism for establishing board accountability under Delaware law.”).
12 See 564 A.2d at 659.
13 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 850
(2005).
14 Id.
15 See generally Anabtawi, supra note 2, at 570 (“[The] limitations on the effectiveness of shareholder
participation in corporate decisionmaking suggest that shareholders presently have the potential to operate as
only a weak constraint on managers.”); Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 616 (“[S]hareholder [rights] . . . are so
weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corporate governance.”).
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companies from plurality voting in director elections to majority voting.16
Whereas plurality voting allows a candidate to win an election with a single
shareholder vote if no other candidate received a vote, majority voting requires
a candidate to receive the majority of the votes to win a director seat.17
Because almost all directors run unopposed,18 this development has given
shareholders a more significant voice in director elections.19 Similarly,
nonstaggered boards are becoming more prevalent, thereby increasing the
opportunities for shareholders to vote.20
The SEC and Congress have been attempting to expand proxy access to
shareholders, which would allow shareholders to nominate directors and have
their choices included in the proxy.21 The SEC’s efforts suffered a setback
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Exchange Act
Rule 14a-11, a regulation which would have allowed proxy access for certain
shareholders.22 However, the SEC successfully amended Exchange Act Rule
14a-8 to prevent companies from excluding shareholder proposals that relate to
director elections, nominations, or the procedures for the elections.23 In
response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, which contains a provision that calls for “say on pay” votes.24
This provision requires that “shareholders have a periodic nonbinding vote on
executive compensation at least once every three years.”25 Despite the vote’s
nonbinding nature, the “say on pay” provision has attracted considerable
attention for “substantially increas[ing] the number of proxy votes on ballots
annually.”26 Likewise, individual shareholders have also pushed for proxy
access. For example, Amalgamated Bank, which owns close to 400,000 shares
16 See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 873
(2010) (“[T]he shift to a majority standard substantially increases the importance of shareholder voting in
uncontested elections.”).
17 Id. at 872–73.
18 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2390 (2009).
19 See Choi et al., supra note 16, at 873.
20 See id.
21 Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: Is H-P Setting a Trend for Proxy Access?, WALL ST. J. BLOG DEAL J.
(Feb. 7, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/02/07/dealpolitik-is-h-p-setting-a-trend-for-proxyaccess/.
22 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY
ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 4 (2011),
available at http://www.hrpolicy.org/downloads/2011/c11-07a%20Proxy%20Advisory%20White%20Paper%
20_FULL%20COLOR_.pdf.
25 CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 24, at 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1).
26 CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 24, at 4.
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of Hewlett-Packard, successfully negotiated for Hewlett-Packard to
recommend a proxy access proposal at its annual shareholder meeting in
2013.27
As the private and regulatory attention on shareholder voting has increased,
there has been an amplified focus on, and criticism of, the ultimate role proxy
advisory firms play in corporate governance. Section B discusses the role of
proxy advisory firms and their influence on shareholding voting.
B. The Rise of Proxy Advisory Firms
Employed by an array of institutional investors,28 proxy advisory firms
provide analysis and voting recommendations on shareholder voting issues
included in proxy statements.29 The first proxy advisory firm was Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), which began offering voting recommendation
services to institutional investors in 1986.30 ISS, which merged with
RiskMetrics in 2007, has remained the titan of the industry, boasting “over
1,700 institutional clients managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the
top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 asset managers and 17 of the top 25
public pension funds.”31 The proxy advisory firms of Egan-Jones Proxy (EganJones) and Glass, Lewis & Company (Glass Lewis) entered the market in 2002
and 2003, respectively,32 and PROXY Governance, Incorporated which
received the backing of Business Roundtable,33 began making
recommendations in 2005.34
27

Barusch, supra note 21.
The SEC Concept Release said clients of proxy advisory firms are “investment advisers, pension plans,
employee benefit plans, bank trust department and funds.” Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act
Release No. 29,340, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 43,009 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release].
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES
RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 1–2 (2007) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]; see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 28. Additional services provided by proxy advisory
firms include vote execution on behalf of clients, administrative tasks related to vote casting, and oversight of
decisions by corporations. See id.
30 Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649,
651–52 (2009).
31 Id. at 652–53 (internal quotation marks omitted); Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good
Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 2 (Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper
No. 1, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093.
32 Choi et al., supra note 30, at 654.
33 Id.
34 Id. PROXY Governance, Inc. folded in 2010 and subsequently entered into an agreement to transfer its
clients to Glass Lewis. Glass Lewis Announces Agreement with PGI, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/glass-lewis-announces-agreement-with-pgi-112178089.html.
28
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The appearance of competing proxy advisory firms has been attributed to a
response to massive frauds perpetrated by public companies,35 the expanded
fiduciary duties the SEC implemented in 2003 requiring institutional investors
to vote in the “best interest” of their clients,36 and the tremendous growth of
institutional ownership of publicly traded securities.37 The latter two
developments go hand in hand with explaining the rise of proxy advisory
firms: holdings of publicly traded stocks by institutional investors grew from
37% in 1992 to more than 60% in 2005,38 and institutional investors hire proxy
advisory firms based on a belief that the firms’ voting recommendations will
satisfy the “best interest” requirement of the new SEC regulations.39 Simply
put, more potential clients entered the market, and more incentives were given
for them to engage the services of proxy advisory firms.
The increase in prominence of proxy advisory firms, combined with
concerns over the lack of accountability and the scope of influence they exert
over their clients, has prompted a call for regulation of proxy advisory firms in
an effort to bring this industry within the oversight of the SEC.40
II. THE CALL FOR REGULATION
On July 22, 2010, the SEC published the Concept Release on the U.S.
Proxy System.41 In the Concept Release, the SEC raised two issues associated
with the current operation of proxy advisory firms that could impair
shareholder voting: (1) a lack of “adequate accountability for informational
accuracy in the development and application of voting standards,” and (2)
conflicts of interests that are “insufficiently disclosed and managed.”42 It also
voiced concerns about the scope of influence proxy advisory firms hold over
their clients, “without appropriate oversight” or “an actual economic stake in
35

See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for
Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 392 (2009) (citing GAO REPORT, supra note
29, at 6–7).
36 See Choi et al., supra note 30, at 653; see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2012); GAO REPORT, supra
note 29, at 7. Further emphasis was placed on proxy voting when the SEC adopted Rule 30b1-4 under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which required annual disclosure of their voting policies. See Choi et al.,
supra note 30, at 653.
37 See Choi et al., supra note 30, at 655.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,009–10 (justifying regulation of proxy advisory firms
based on their “solicitation” of votes or their role as “investment advisers”).
41 Id. at 42,982.
42 Id. at 43,011.
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the issuer.”43 The SEC proffered three possible avenues of regulation to
address these concerns: (1) subjecting proxy advisory firms to the rules
governing proxy solicitation; (2) amending Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to include
relevant provisions to address proxy advisory firms; or (3) amending the
Advisers Act to require registration for all proxy advisory firms.44
Many of the comments to the Concept Release advanced the same concerns
voiced by the SEC. While the comments favored the regulations proposed by
the SEC, they also suggested that more expansive regulatory measures should
be adopted. At the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue, then-SEC
Chairperson Mary Schapiro remarked that many of the comments indicated
frustration with the scope of influence proxy advisory firms have, and she
raised questions about the accountability of the firms and the quality of the
information they provide.45 Ultimately, boards of directors feel that proxy
advisory firm recommendations interfere with constructive dialogue between
the board and shareholders that use proxy advisory firms’ recommendations.46
In light of these comments and the SEC’s assessment of the proxy advising
industry, the SEC has recently announced that it will provide guidance to
Congress on how to regulate proxy advisory firms.47
There are two forms of regulatory measures that may be used in the
regulation of proxy advisory firms. The first (“soft regulation”) focuses chiefly
on the avoidance of conflicts of interest and the establishment of regulatory
oversight, and it requires all proxy advisory firms to register with the SEC.48
The second (“hard regulation”) centers on the power and influence of proxy
advisory firms and seeks strict oversight of their voting methodologies, the
justifications behind their recommendations, and other means of policing the
actual product the proxy advisory firms provide.49 Generally, hard regulation
subsumes soft regulation.50
43

Id.
Id. at 43,012–13.
45 Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue, supra note 7.
46 Id.
47 Reese Darragh, SEC Reveals Plan to Regulate Proxy Advisory Firms, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-reveals-plan-to-regulate-proxy-advisory-firms/article/219827/.
48 See Letter from Glenn Davis, Senior Research Assoc., Council of Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6–7 (Oct. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Council of Institutional
Investors Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-80.pdf (“The Council supports
the registration of proxy advisory firms, but opposes regulatory involvement in methodologies used by proxy
advisers to determine vote recommendations.”).
49 For instance, the Shareholder Communications Coalition (comprised of the Business Roundtable, the
National Investor Relations Institute, and the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals,
44
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Central to both soft and hard regulation of proxy advisory firms is the
registration of firms with the SEC. In its Concept Release, the SEC suggested
two pieces of existing federal legislation that could be used as avenues to gain
oversight of proxy advisory firms.51 The first is Rule 14a-(2)(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act of 1934,52 which currently exempts proxy advisory firms from
federal proxy rules. An amendment, revision, or some means of “interpretive
guidance” to Rule 14a-(2)(b)(3) is “one potential solution to the concerns
regarding a proxy advisory firm’s disclosures about conflicts of interest.”53 The
Advisers Act of 1940 is the second piece of existing legislation that could be
amended to mandate registration of proxy advisory firms.54
A. Exchange Act Rule 14-a(2)(b)(3) and the Federal Proxy Rules
Federal proxy rules provide that anyone who solicits a proxy from a
shareholder must comport with the registration requirements of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l.55 This provision requires fairly extensive disclosures of information,
including “the organization, financial structure, and nature of the business”;56
information about “the directors, officers, and underwriters, and each security
holder . . . holding more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security
of the issuer”;57 “management and service contracts”;58 profit and loss
statements;59 balance sheets with up to three of the previous fiscal years
certified by a registered public accounting firm;60 and “any further financial
statements which the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors.”61 The SEC explained that the definition of solicitation
is broad and, depending on their activities, proxy advisory firms may fall

with the Securities Transfer Association as an associate member) sent a letter to then-Chairperson Mary
Schapiro articulating a proposed regulatory framework for proxy advisory firms. See Shareholder
Communications Coalition Letter, supra note 4.
50 See id. at 2–4 (proposing measures to correct inaccuracies and address conflicts of interest).
51 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012–13.
52 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2012).
53 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012.
54 See id. at 43,010.
55 See Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006).
56 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(A).
57 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(D). The named people must supply “their remuneration and their interests in the
securities of, and their material contracts with, the issuer and any person directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with, the issuer.” Id.
58 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(G).
59 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(K).
60 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(J).
61 Id. § 78l(b)(1)(L).
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within the broad definition of solicitation “because they provide
recommendations that are reasonably calculated to result in the procurement,
withholding, or revocation of a proxy.”62
Due to the expansive definition of solicitation, proxy advisory firms would
be subject to federal proxy rules if not for the exemption found in Exchange
Act Rule 14a-2(b)(3).63 Rule 14a-2(b)(3) exempts “the furnishing of proxy
voting advice by any advisor to any other person with whom the advisor has a
business relationship”64 from the federal proxy requirements, so long as four
requirements are met: (1) “The advisor renders financial advice in the ordinary
course of his business”;65 (2) “The advisor discloses to the recipient of the
advice any significant relationship with the registrant or any of its affiliates, or
a security holder proponent of the matter on which advice is given, as well as
any material interests of the advisor in such matter”;66 (3) “The advisor
receives no special commission or remuneration for furnishing the proxy
voting advice from any person other than a recipient of the advice and other
persons who receive similar advice under this subsection”;67 and (4) “The
proxy voting advice is not furnished on behalf of any person soliciting proxies
or on behalf of a participant in an election subject to the provisions of
§ 240.14a-12(c).”68
The second requirement, which provides that an advisor must disclose “any
significant relationship” with a party related to the matter upon which advice is
given, is where the SEC would look to propose regulation.69 Many proxy
advisory firms give disclaimers that say they may have business relationships
with issuers: Glass Lewis provides an extensive disclosure and conflict-ofinterest statement on its website,70 and ISS has a “Due Diligence Compliance
Package” available on its website that includes a “Conflict Policy Review”
undertaken by Sullivan & Cromwell.71 Despite the efforts of proxy advisory

62

SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,009.
Id.
64 Id.
65 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3)(i) (2012).
66 Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(3)(ii).
67 Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(3)(iii).
68 Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(3)(iv).
69 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012–13.
70 Conflict of Interest Statement, GLASS LEWIS & CO., http://www.glasslewis.com/about-glass-lewis/
disclosure-of-conflict/ (last visited June 18, 2013).
71 Due Diligence Materials, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/duediligence (last visited June 18,
2013); Letter from H. Rodgin Cohen & Marc R. Trevino, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Nominating &
63
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firms to apprise their clients of possible conflicts of interest, the SEC has
suggested the need for regulation aimed at ensuring that disclosures are
adequate, and that potential conflicts of interests are sufficiently explained to
investors.72 In practice, this means that Rule 14a-2(b)(3) would be amended to
“require more specific disclosure regarding the presence of a potential
conflict.”73
Further reform to the Rule 14a-2(b)(3) exemption would center on
addressing the gray area between fraud and subpar advice.74 Firms that avoid
disclosure due to Rule 14a-2(b)(3) are still subject to Rule 14a-9’s antifraud
provisions,75 which prevent the firms from giving voting advice that is “false
or misleading” due to any statements or omissions of material fact.76 The mere
absence of fraud is not sufficiently palliative to “certain participants in the
proxy process,”77 who would like to amend Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to specifically
require that proxy advisory firms divulge the reasoning behind their
recommendations to ensure accuracy.78
Including proxy advisory firms within the purview of the federal proxy
rules, as discussed above, would address the major concerns articulated by the
SEC by substantially increasing regulatory oversight. However, it is not as
stringent of a measure as forcing proxy advisory firms to register as investment
advisers under the Advisers Act of 1940, which is discussed in the next
section.
B. Regulation Under the Advisers Act
Proxy advisory firms are already subject to certain provisions of the
Advisers Act because they qualify as “investment advisers.”79 An investment
adviser is someone who, “for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
Corporate Governance Comm., RiskMetrics Grp., Inc. (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://www.
issgovernance.com/files/ISS_Corporate_Services_Conflict_Policy_Review_Project.pdf.
72 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012–13.
73 Id. at 43,013.
74 See id. at 43,012.
75 Id.
76 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2012).
77 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012.
78 Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter American Bar Association Letter],
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-283.pdf.
79 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010.
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investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or . . . issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities.”80 Under Section 206 of the Advisers
Act, investment advisers are subject to a fiduciary duty to their advisory
clients.81 Section 206 also contains antifraud provisions that apply to
investment advisers82 and gives the SEC the authority “to adopt rules
‘reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business
as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.’”83
Although proxy advisers are already subject to some regulation, they are
not required to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act.84 In fact,
investment advisers who have less than $110 million in assets under their
management are prohibited from registration.85 As explained in the Concept
Release, “[p]roxy advisory firms are unlikely to have sufficient assets under
management to register with the Commission because they typically do not
manage client assets.”86 However, several proxy advisory firms, most notably
ISS, are eligible to register with the SEC87 because they qualify for one of the
exemptions under Rule 203A-2 of the Advisers Act.88 Firms such as Egan80 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006); accord SEC Concept
Release, supra note 28, at 43,010 (“[P]roxy advisory firms provide analyses of shareholder proposals, director
candidacies or corporate actions and provide advice concerning particular votes in a manner that is intended to
assist their institutional clients in achieving their investment goals with respect to the voting securities they
hold. In that way, proxy advisory firms meet the definition of investment adviser because they, for
compensation, engage in the business of issuing reports or analyses concerning securities and providing advice
to others as to the value of securities.”).
81 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010 (“The Supreme Court has construed Section 206 of the
Advisers Act as establishing a federal fiduciary standard governing the conduct of investment advisers.”). The
Court interpreted the provisions as Congress’s intention to “eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of
interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which
was not disinterested.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963).
82 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) to (2); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010.
83 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010 (quoting Political Contributions by Certain Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3043, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,018, 41,022 (July 14, 2010)). Section
206(4) was added to the Advisers Act by the 1960 amendments to the Act. See id. at 43,010 n.254; see also
Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885.
84 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,009–10.
85 Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm (last visited June 18, 2013). The SEC Concept
Release, as well as the responses to it, was authored when the threshold was $25 million. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b3a(a)(1); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010.
86 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010.
87 James Hyatt, Proxy Advisors Find Themselves in the Spotlight, BUS. ETHICS (May 17, 2010),
http://business-ethics.com/2010/05/17/243-proxy-advisors-find-themselves-in-the-spotlight/; Proxy Advisory
Services, SHAREHOLDER COMM. COALITION, http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/proxyadvisory.html (last
visited June 18, 2013).
88 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(c); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010.
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Jones89 and Glass Lewis90 do not qualify for such an exemption, and therefore
they have not registered with the SEC.91
Registration imposes several additional duties on governed entities. These
include disclosure of arrangements that may lead to conflicts of interest with
their clients,92 implementation and annual review of internal compliance
programs designed to ensure compliance with the Advisers Act,93 designation
of a chief compliance officer to oversee the compliance program,94 and the
creation and preservation of records to be inspected by an SEC examiner.95
The SEC is considering the following two amendments to the Advisers Act:
(1) creating an exemption for registration to allow nonregistered firms to
register,96 and (2) expanding both the disclosure requirements regarding
potential conflicts of interest, as well as the fiduciary duty that proxy advisory
firms have to their clients.97
C. Hard Regulation Proposals
The SEC limited its proposed regulatory frameworks to those discussed
above, but it left the door open to the possibility of additional, tougher
regulations. Such regulations include requiring “increased disclosure regarding
the extent of research involved with a particular recommendation and the
extent and/or effectiveness of its controls and procedures in ensuring the
89

The SEC provides a searchable database on its website that contains all registered investment advisers;
a search for Egan-Jones yields no result. Investment Adviser Search, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/%28S%28g5ama2zwsjjj5gswxtg10v3y%29%29/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_S
earch.aspx (last visited June 18, 2013).
90 Letter from Katherine Rabin, Chief Exec. Officer, & Robert McCormick, Chief Policy Officer, Glass
Lewis & Co., to Office of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB32-053.pdf (“[W]e are not registered as an investment advisor.”).
91 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,010; Hyatt, supra note 87; Proxy Advisory Services, supra
note 87.
92 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011 n.265 (“Part II of Form ADV, or a brochure containing
the information in the Form, is required to be delivered to advisory clients or prospective clients by Rule 204-3
under the Advisers Act [17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3]. In addition to the disclosure of certain conflicts of interest,
Part II contains information including the adviser’s fee schedule and the educational and business background
of management and key advisory personnel of the adviser. Part II is currently not submitted to the SEC but
must be kept by advisers in their files and made available to the SEC upon request and is ‘considered filed.’”).
93 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a) to (b) (2012); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
94 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(c); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
95 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2; SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
96 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,013 (“[W]e should establish an additional exemption from
the prohibition on federal registration for proxy advisory firms to register with the Commission as investment
advisers.”).
97 See id.
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accuracy of issuer data” and “requiring proxy advisory firms to file their voting
recommendations with [the SEC] as soliciting material . . . to facilitate
independent evaluation by market participants of the quality of those
recommendations.”98 To this end, the Shareholder Communications Coalition,
whose membership is composed of some of the largest corporate officer
groups,99 proposed a regulatory framework that called for the firms to maintain
public records of all voting recommendations—with disclosure of the data,
information, and rationales used to come to the recommendations.100 The
proposed framework also suggested requiring that proxy advisory firms
provide all public companies with drafts of the proxy advisory firms’ reports
prior to dissemination to clients.101 Furthermore, should a public company find
an error in the report, proxy advisory firms would have to correct the error.102
The response letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz suggested similar
regulatory steps to those of the Shareholder Communication Coalition. The
powerhouse law firm recommended “the institution of a standardized process
for issuer review of proxy advisory reports during the drafting process, on a
timetable that allows for meaningful dialogue between the issuer and the proxy
advisory firm regarding any alleged factual mistakes or other disagreements
over the objective components of the report,” as well as the right of issuers to
have their response letter included in the final report provided by the proxy
advisory firm to its clients.103 This is designed to “contextualize” the
recommendation made by a proxy advisory firm, and to give shareholders “a
full understanding of the relevant viewpoints.”104
Without chronicling every proposed regulatory framework, there are still
those who propose even more stringent oversight measures.105 The details of
98

Id.
About the Coalition, SHAREHOLDER COMM. COALITION, http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/about.
html (last visited June 18, 2013). Its membership includes the Business Roundtable, an association of chief
executive officers of publicly traded companies that account for almost one-third of the total value of the U.S.
stock markets. Id.
100 Shareholder Communications Coalition Letter, supra note 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 7 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Wachtell Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1410/s71410-129.pdf.
104 Id. at 8.
105 See, e.g., Letter from Donald G. Kalfen, Partner, Michael Powers, Managing Partner, & Jim Wolf,
Managing Partner, Meridian Comp. Partners, LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 3–4 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-156.pdf
(recommending that proxy advisory firms develop policies regarding conflicts of interest, interactions with
99
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each proposal differ only slightly, yet all are motivated by the same desire to
curb the influence of proxy advisory firms and advance the same general
framework of forcing proxy advisory firms to disclose the underpinnings of
their recommendations.
III. THE MOTIVATIONS FOR REGULATION
To create a proper regulatory framework for the proxy advisory industry,
an analysis of the justifications and motivations underlying the movement
toward regulation is necessary. This Part first explains the two primary
concerns associated with proxy advisory firms—the existence of conflicts of
interest and the scope of influence firms wield over their clients—and then
uses recent studies and other relevant evidence to show that the concerns
underlying this motivation are overstated.
A. Conflicts of Interest
The potential for conflicts of interest has long been a subject of concern for
observers of proxy advisory firms: the SEC addressed it in the Concept
Release,106 scholarly literature frequently discusses it,107 and it is a persistent
refrain in the comment letters sent to the SEC.108 The Concept Release
identified several ways in which conflicts of interest may take shape. First, a
conflict may arise when a proxy advisory firm gives voting recommendations
on a matter put to a shareholder vote while simultaneously offering consulting
services to the issuer or proponent of the proposal.109 There are two concerns
associated with this type of conflict. For one thing, the issuer may feel tempted
to purchase services from the proxy advisory firm to garner support for its

issuers, internal controls used to ensure the accuracy of information, and the designation of a chief compliance
officer to administer these policies). The letter went on to note that the authors “believe[d] it [was] appropriate
and important for the Commission to promulgate rules overseeing the operations of proxy advisory firms.” Id.
at 3.
106 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011–12.
107 See, e.g., Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 399–400; Choi et al., supra note 30, at 657–58, 697; Paul Rose,
Commentary, On the Role and Regulation of Proxy Advisors, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62–63
(2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/rose.pdf.
108 See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011–12; GAO REPORT, supra note 29. For a
nonexhaustive look at concerns raised from comments submitted to the SEC, see American Bar Association
Letter, supra note 78; Council of Institutional Investors Letter, supra note 48; Letter from Darren T. Brady,
Manager, & James Davidson, Assistant Manager, Hermes Equity Ownership Servs., to Elizabeth Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1410/s71410-150.pdf.
109 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011–12 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 10–11).
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proposal.110 Also, a proxy advisory firm may recommend an issuer’s proposal
to avoid alienating the issuer and losing its business.111 In either case, the
underlying concern is that the integrity of a voting recommendation issued by
the proxy advisory firm will be compromised by business considerations.
The other potential conflict of interest occurs when a proxy advisory firm
provides corporate governance ratings to institutional investors while
simultaneously offering services to the subject corporation so that it can
receive a higher corporate governance score.112 This potential conflict of
interest exists only for ISS, as it is the only proxy advisory firm with corporate
clients that provides corporate governance ratings.113 The GAO report114 noted
that there are “various situations” in which advising both corporation and
investor could lead to conflicts of interest.115 The implication is that ISS may
be acting in a similar vein as WorldCom and Enron116 or, if such a comparison
is too strong, that there is a clear element of impropriety in this business
model, through which ISS “serv[es] two masters.”117

110

Id. at 43,012.
Id.
112 Id.
113 Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 397 (noting that Glass Lewis has made inroads into ISS’s market share by
not selling governance advice to corporations, which makes it “free from the perceived conflict-of-interest
problems that cloud ISS’[s] recommendations”); Colin Diamond & Irina Yevmenenko, Who Is Overseeing the
Proxy Advisors?, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 606, 608 (2008) (“ISS also provides corporate governance
consulting services. By contrast, the other three proxy advisors do not provide consulting services.”); Robert
D. Hershey Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6
(“Both [Glass Lewis and PROXY Governance] proclaim themselves free of conflicts of interest, because, they
say, they do not advise corporations on governance issues.”).
114 In 2007, two members of Congress requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report
on the state of the proxy advisory industry. Specifically, the GAO was asked to look into (1) “potential
conflicts of interest that may exist with proxy advisory firms and the steps that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has taken to oversee these firms”; (2) “the factors that may impede or promote competition
within the proxy advisory industry”; and (3) “institutional investors’ use of the firms’ services and the firms’
potential influence on proxy vote outcomes.” GAO REPORT, supra note 29.
115 For instance, the report gives the following hypothetical: “ISS could help a corporate client design an
executive compensation proposal to be voted on by shareholders and subsequently make a recommendation to
investor clients to vote for this proposal.” Id. at 10.
116 Peter Galuszka, Conflicts of Interest in Advisory Firms, CBS MONEY WATCH (July 15, 2008, 7:49
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-28241214/conflicts-of-interest-in-advisory-firms/?tag=
bnetdomain (“Gee, isn’t it funny that the big accounting firms got into big trouble a few years ago for profiting
from a very similar situation. They vetted financial reports of companies while selling them consulting
services, with the idea being, (wink wink) that if you play ball on hiring our consultants, we’ll play ball on
your screwy, dishonest financial statements.”).
117 See Gretchen Morgenson, And They Call This Advice?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 3, at 1
[hereinafter Morgenson, And They Call This Advice?]; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Pfizer and the Proxy
Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Morgenson, Pfizer] (wondering whether Pfizer’s CEO’s
111
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B. Fears of Influence
Those advocating for more stringent regulations are also concerned with
the influence proxy advisory firms purportedly wield over their clients. The
Shareholder Communications Coalition’s letter cited the “tremendous
influence of proxy advisory firms” as justification for mandating that proxy
advisory firms maintain public records of their recommendations and disclose
the data, information, and reasoning they use when formulating those
recommendations.118 Leo E. Strine, Jr. has frequently painted proxy advisory
firms as unaccountable bogeymen.119 In labeling ISS an interloper that is
taking advantage of an “opportunistic breach,” Strine highlighted the
fundamental mistrust and skepticism that proxy advisory firms face from
established business interests and corporate issuers.120
Even those who use less derisive language than Strine still characterize
proxy advisory firms as wielding significant power over institutional investors.
For instance, corporate law scholar Professor Lynn Stout stated that
institutional investors “follow ISS [vote recommendations] en masse,”121 and
Professor Tamara Belinfanti characterized institutional investors’ use of proxy
advisory firms as the “transferring [of] power” to proxy advisory firms.122
Corporate issuers echoed these sentiments. In a letter to the SEC, the 3M
Company bemoaned the power conferred “on a small group of associations
recommendation to buy and promote PROXY Governance “reflects an unbiased point of view or a relationship
with the company and its top executive”).
118 Shareholder Communications Coalition Letter, supra note 4, at 3.
119 Strine painted proxy advisory firms, specifically ISS, as feudal lords-cum-oracles:
[The proxy advisory firms forced] powerful CEOs [to] come on bended knee to Rockville,
Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views about
issues like proposed mergers, executive compensation, and poison pills. They do so because the
CEOs recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s advice rather than do
any thinking of their own. ISS has been so successful that it now has a California rival, Glass
Lewis.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and
Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005) [hereinafter Strine, The Delaware Way]; see also Strine,
supra note 1, at 1765 (“The influence of ISS and its competitors over institutional investor voting behavior is
so considerable that the traditionalist will be concerned that any initiative to increase stockholder power will
simply shift more clout to firms of this kind—firms even more unaccountable than their institutional investor
clients.”).
120 Strine, The Delaware Way, supra note 119, at 688.
121 Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be the
New Master of the Corporate Governance Universe?, CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006, at 14, 15) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122 Id. at 389.
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with ranking systems.”123 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz described proxy
advisory firms as “powerful intermediaries with great influence over corporate
policy” that do not have an “equivalent economic interest.”124 Thus, there is a
persistent chorus—comprised of government representatives, academics, and
businesses—identifying proxy advisory firms as wielders of significant power
that must be reined in.
C. Revisiting the Motivations for Regulation
1. Conflicts of Interest
While conflicts of interest could potentially undermine the integrity of
voting recommendations, the concerns are exaggerated. The GAO report found
that the SEC’s examination of firms registered as investment advisers did not
reveal any major violations.125 ISS, the largest and most successful proxy
advisory firm, is already registered with the SEC under the Advisers Act,126
and it is thus already subject to disclosure arrangements that may reveal
conflicts of interest, implementation and annual review of internal compliance
programs designed to ensure compliance with the Advisers Act,127 designation
of a chief compliance officer to oversee the compliance program,128 and the
creation and preservation of records to be inspected by an SEC examiner.129
Furthermore, ISS has taken several steps in response to the heavy criticism
it receives for providing corporate governance services in addition to its
shareholder voting services. Most notably, ISS has created a firewall between
the proxy advisory and corporate governance businesses: they have separate
staffs, operate in separate buildings, and even go so far as to “use segregated
office equipment and information databases in order to help avoid discovery of
corporate clients by the proxy advisory staff.”130 According to a statement on
its website, the company has instituted a policy requiring every ISS proxy
analysis to “carry a disclosure statement advising the client of the work of ICS
123 Letter from W. James McNerney, Jr., Chairman of the Bd. & Chief Exec. Officer, 3M Corp., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s71903/3m120503.htm.
124 Wachtell Letter, supra note 103, at 1.
125 GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 3–4.
126 CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 24, at 63.
127 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2012); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
128 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(c); SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
129 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2; SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,011.
130 GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 10.

EDELMAN GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

6/26/2013 11:43 AM

PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS

1387

[ISS Corporate Services, Inc.] and advising ISS’s institutional clients that they
can get information about an issuer’s use of ICS’s products and services.”131
These steps appear to have mollified many of the concerns held by institutional
investors that subscribe to ISS.132 Moreover, most institutional investors
conduct due diligence “to obtain reasonable assurance that ISS or any other
proxy advisory firm is independent and free from conflicts of interest,” and
retain the ability to take steps on their own to discern conflicts of interest.133
If institutional investors are unsatisfied with ISS’s efforts to limit the
occurrence of conflicts of interest, institutional investors can subscribe to a
firm that does not provide corporate governance advice. Indeed, Glass Lewis’s
growth has been attributed to its abstention from offering corporate governance
advice, which “free[s] [Glass Lewis] from the perceived conflict-of-interest
problems that cloud ISS’[s] recommendations.”134 Critics may note that Glass
Lewis is not registered under the Advisers Act.135 Thus, an institutional
investor’s choice is limited to an unregistered proxy advisory firm that is not
affected by this type of conflict of interest and a registered firm that is so
affected. This point undermines the supposed pressing need to regulate proxy
advisory firms by forcing them to register under the Advisers Act: ISS, the
largest proxy advisory firm and, unsurprisingly, the one that elicits the most
concern,136 is already registered (and therefore owes its clients a fiduciary
duty), and this has done nothing to appease the critics of proxy advisory
firms.137
131 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., INC., DUE DILIGENCE
COMPLIANCE PACKAGE (2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISSDueDiligenceCompliance
Package20110413.pdf; Due Diligence Materials, supra note 71.
132 GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 11.
133 Id. (“As part of this process, many of these institutional investors said they review ISS’s conflict
policies and periodically meet with ISS representatives to discuss these policies and any changes to ISS’s
business that could create additional conflicts. Finally, . . . institutional investors told us that ISS’s
recommendations are generally not the sole basis for their voting decisions, which further reduces the chances
that these potential conflicts would unduly influence how they vote.”).
134 Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 397.
135 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
136 See Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 406 (“From an agency theory perspective, ISS presents a lethal
combination—significant power and virtually no accountability.”); American Bar Association Letter, supra
note 78, at 28 (observing that ISS is amongst the most significant firms contributing to owners not actually
exercising their shareholder franchise).
137 When Providian Financial Corporation merged with Washington Mutual, both Glass Lewis and Egan
Jones recommended that shareholders vote against the proposal. Morgenson, And They Call This Advice?,
supra note 117. ISS, meanwhile, gave a lukewarm report echoing many of the complaints that were made by
Glass Lewis and Egan Jones, but ultimately approved the merger on the basis that there was “insufficient
consensus surrounding Providian’s long-term earnings potential that would warrant a higher valuation and
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Notably, proxy advisory firms do not give recommendations in secrecy or
in a vacuum. The default (not customized) recommendations of proxy advisory
firms are often publicized and compared to one another,138 and many
institutional investors subscribe to more than one proxy advisory firm,
maintain in-house research staff, or both.139 This allows for market forces to
bear on proxy advisory firms: if a firm issues a recommendation that is out of
step with other firms or an institutional investor’s in-house research staff, it
could be subject to scrutiny.140 As an example, for a 2006 director election at
Pfizer, both Glass Lewis and ISS recommended that shareholders withhold
votes for certain board members due to the corporation’s pay practices.141
PROXY Governance, however, gave a recommendation in favor of all thirteen
directors, for which it was criticized.142
Proxy advisory firms have a vested interest in avoiding conflicts of interest.
When a firm’s integrity is called into question, there can be severe damage to
the company. By way of example, in 2006, Glass Lewis was purchased by
Chinese media conglomerate Xinhua Media.143 Being associated with “an
information and media conglomerate with close ties to the Chinese
government” created an appearance of impropriety that had deleterious effects
on Glass Lewis: two prominent executives quit, clients departed, and
ultimately the firm had to be sold.144 At the heart of this ordeal was the erosion
of Glass Lewis’s reputation as a result of it being owned by an unseemly
Chinese company.145
Though conflicts of interest are by their very nature difficult to see and can
never be guaranteed to be fully accounted for, the possibility of their existence
does not justify imposing any and all manners of regulation to address the

voting against this transaction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite being registered as an
investment adviser, ISS was still attacked for being potentially conflicted. Id.
138 Id. (comparing recommendations regarding Providian Financial’s merger with Washington Mutual);
Mia Lamar, Proxy Advisory Firms Split in Icahn–Oshkosh Battle, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204555904577168740496960360.html.
139 GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
140 See, e.g., Morgenson, And They Call This Advice?, supra note 117 (analyzing the differing
recommendations of ISS and of Glass Lewis and Egan-Jones); Morgenson, Pfizer, supra note 117 (examining
the split between PROXY Governance, ISS, and Glass Lewis regarding votes for board members over
executive pay).
141 Morgenson, Pfizer, supra note 117.
142 Id.
143 CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 24, at 34–35.
144 Id. at 35.
145 Id.
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problem. As this section shows, institutional investors have measures at their
disposal to uncover conflicts of interest, while market scrutiny favors
disclosure of conflicts of interest by proxy advisory firms, thereby ameliorating
some of the concerns that proxy advisory firms are plagued with significant
issues of conflicts of interest. The next section shows that the concerns over
the influence of proxy advisory firms are overstated as well.
2. Fears of Influence
In 2010, a group of professors conducted an empirical study of uncontested
director elections from 2005 to 2006.146 They analyzed how four of the largest
proxy advisory firms made their recommendations147 and the influence of
those recommendations on shareholder voting.148 This study was distinguished
from other studies on the topic because it addressed the underlying factors that
influence both the recommendation and the vote.149 This conceptually and
empirically disentangled the difference between a recommendation being
correlated with a vote or being the cause of a vote. Their findings undermined
the claim that proxy advisory firms wield tremendous influence.
The study indicated that ISS is the only proxy advisory firm whose
recommendation causes a significant shift in votes: the authors “consider[ed] it
likely that an ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of shareholder votes.”150
In consideration of the estimates of other commentators, which range from
19%151 to 30%,152 it appears that the fears surrounding the scope of ISS’s
influence are significantly overstated.153 As Choi, Kahan, and Fisch further
suggested, much of the influence that ISS has may be attributed to it being the
146

See Choi et al., supra note 30, at 651; Choi et al., supra note 16, at 871–73.
Choi et al., supra note 30, at 651. They focused on uncontested director elections due to both practical
concerns and the import of the votes, as the directors manage the corporations. Id. On the practical level, the
frequency of such votes made it easier to measure the recommendations.
148 Choi et al., supra note 16, at 871–73.
149 Id. at 869.
150 Id. at 906.
151 Cai et al., supra note 18, at 2404.
152 William J. Holstein, Is ISS Too Powerful? And Whose Interests Does It Serve?, CBS MONEY WATCH
(Feb. 7, 2008, 11:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-28241100/is-iss-too-powerful-andwhose-interests-does-it-serve/.
153 Council of Institutional Investors Letter, supra note 48, at 5–6 (“ISS issued a baseline recommendation
of ‘against’ for 28 out of 136 management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals in 2010. Only three of the 28
proposals actually failed to pass, and the average shareowner support of those 28 proposals was 74
percent. . . . Of 15,044 ISS baseline recommendations for nominees in 2010, 13 percent were ‘withhold’ or
‘against.’ Of the 1,879 nominees receiving ‘withhold’ or ‘against’ baseline recommendations with available
voting results, less than 5 percent failed to receive majority support from shareowners.”).
147

EDELMAN GALLEYSPROOFS1

1390

6/26/2013 11:43 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1369

proxy advisory firm most aligned with shareholder preferences.154 Conversely,
the other proxy advisory firms are less influential because they are arguably
less in sync with the factors that shareholders care about.155 The findings
indicated that ISS may dominate the market by catering to the market. As a
result, if ISS ceased giving recommendations that aligned with its clients’
preferences, ISS would lose its influence.156 ISS therefore isn’t a “Pied Piper,”
but instead “an information agent and guide, helping investors to identify
voting decisions that are consistent with their existing preferences.”157
The GAO report produced at the behest of the SEC echoed the findings of
Professors Choi, Fisch, and Kahan. It included a survey of thirty-one randomly
selected institutional investors, including twenty “large” institutional
investors.158 Of the twenty large investors interviewed, fifteen reported that
they generally rely more on their own in-house research staffs than the
recommendations of proxy advisory firms.159 These investors subscribed to
proxy advisory firms to “supplement their own analysis,” and use the
recommendations as one of several factors in formulating their vote.160
Fourteen of the large institutional investors said they used a customizable
voting policy; “proxy advisory firms simply apply their clients’ voting policies,
which then drive the voting decisions.”161 Eight of the investors said they
subscribed to more than one proxy advisory firm to “gain a broader range of
information on proxy issues and to help make well-informed voting
decisions.”162 The results of the survey were consistent with the conclusions
drawn from Choi, Fisch, and Kahan’s study: proxy advisory firms are less Pied
Pipers and more “information agent[s] and guide[s].”163
It is worth noting that the eleven “small” institutional investors interviewed
indicated that they were more likely to rely heavily on proxy advisory firm
154

Choi et al., supra note 16, at 899 (“While catering to clients’ views may explain ISS’s market
dominance, it also suggests the limits of such dominance—if ISS were to shift its recommendations away from
the views of its clients, it would likely lose those clients to competing advisory firms.”).
155 Id. at 898–99 (“The results further suggest that these advisors are less in sync with shareholders than
ISS. For example, the four most important factors affecting the recommendations of Egan Jones and Proxy
Governance do not correspond closely to the factors affecting the shareholder vote.”).
156 Id. at 899.
157 Id. at 906.
158 GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.
159 Id. at 16.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Choi et al., supra note 16, at 906.
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recommendations and “vote proxies based strictly on the research and
recommendations of their firm.”164 Nonetheless, these investors acknowledged
that they still have a fiduciary duty to vote the proxies according to the best
interest of their client, and they retain the ability to override the
recommendations of the advisory firm.165 While the results of the GAO report
indicated that small institutional investors are the ones that are at risk of being
influenced by proxy advisory firms, large institutional investors “cast the great
majority of proxy votes made by institutional investors,” which limits the
scope of influence of proxy advisory firms.166
The custom voting policies offered by proxy advisory firms, and frequently
used by institutional investors, provide yet another reason to doubt that proxy
advisory firms have as strong an influence as critics claim. Both ISS167 and
Glass Lewis168 provide customizable voting services, making it difficult for
them to strictly influence subscribers—a point made by both TIAA-CREF169
and the Council of Institutional Investors in response letters to the SEC’s
Concept Release.170 Glass Lewis claimed that “the majority of Glass Lewis’[s]
clients, based on both a pure numerical basis as well as on assets under
management, have elected to vote according to one or more custom voting
policies.”171 In addition to customizable policies, proxy advisory firms also
offer different pre-made voting packages: ISS has policy options for
“sustainability, socially-responsible investors, public funds, labor unions and
mission and faith-based investors.”172 The high degree of control exercised by
clients of proxy advisory firms in selecting the inputs for vote
164
165
166
167

GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 5–6.
Custom Proxy Advisory, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/proxy/custom (last visited June 18,

2013).
168

Letter from Katherine Rabin, Chief Exec. Officer, & Robert McCormick, Chief Policy Officer, Glass
Lewis & Co., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Glass Lewis
Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-100.pdf.
169 Letter from Jonathan Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, & Head of Corporate
Governance, TIAA–CREF, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Nov. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-263.pdf (“In this way, the vote mechanics and
record keeping are technically ‘outsourced’, but the institution itself retains the ability to customize the policy
in furtherance of what the institution believes as a fiduciary to be in the best interests of their clients.”).
170 Council of Institutional Investors Letter, supra note 48, at 6 (“We stress that proxy advisers’ clients
retain the ability to vote however they wish, and regularly diverge from their proxy advisers’ recommendations
through customized voting guidelines or case-by-case review.”).
171 Glass Lewis Letter, supra note 168.
172 Proxy Advisory Services, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/proxy/advisory (last visited June 18,
2013).
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recommendations further weakens the Pied Piper narrative propagated by the
firms’ critics.
Additionally, the existence and use of custom voting policies controverts
the argument that proxy advisory firms only use “one-size-fits-all”
methodologies.173 Ignoring the prevalence of custom voting policies indicates
that many critics do not understand how proxy advisory firms function and
how they are ultimately used. More troubling, the SEC seemingly endorses this
ill-informed viewpoint: the Concept Release highlighted the “concern that
proxy advisory firms may base their recommendation on [a] one-size-fits-all
governance approach.”174 When then-Chairperson Schapiro stated that the SEC
was “considering how to provide guidance on how the federal securities laws
should regulate the activities of proxy advisory firms,” she cited the comments
the SEC received in response to the Concept Release.175 These were the very
comments that mischaracterized how proxy advisory firms formulate
recommendations and how those recommendations are used.
3. Conclusions About the Concerns
The concerns that prompted the push for regulation of proxy advisory firms
are significantly overstated. Former Chairperson Schapiro’s remarks, which
relied on poor information, were especially troubling. Her comment that
“proxy advisory firms may interfere with, rather than enhance, the
communication at the heart of effective engagement” was divorced from
empirical research and the reality of how proxy advisory firms function.176
Former Chairperson Schapiro’s statement gave the impression that she was
giving disproportionate weight to the complaints of companies177 and made no
173 Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 3 (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-261.pdf (noting that
“those policies are by their nature ‘one size fits all’”); Letter from Tom D. Seip, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1410/s71410-196.pdf (“[W]e are concerned with the practice of at least one proxy advisory firm to implement
what is effectively a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy that applies one vote recommendation to all similar proxy
proposals without analyzing the issue on a company-by-company basis.”); Letter from Sidley Austin LLP, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 11 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-14-10/s71410-191.pdf (“[W]e have concerns about the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that some
proxy advisory firms take in their articulation of voting guidelines and the influence that those guidelines
carry.”).
174 SEC Concept Release, supra note 28, at 43,012.
175 Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue, supra note 7.
176 Id.
177 Id. (“Companies are frustrated by the influence these firms have, and worry that they may not be
accountable for, or even concerned with, the quality of the information on which they make voting
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mention of the helpful role proxy advisory firms play. Given her remarks, it
seems possible that regulation of proxy advisory firms may be aimed at
problems that do not exist. While some form of regulation would be beneficial,
proposed regulations should be tailored to real problems and reflect a sufficient
understanding of the issues at hand—especially how vital proxy advisory firms
are to shareholder voting.
IV. HOW IMPORTANT ARE PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS?
This Part shows that proxy advisory firms are highly efficient and crucially
important for the exercise of rational shareholder voting. Utilizing Anthony
Downs’s research on the application of economic theory to democracy, this
Part demonstrates that proxy advisory firms are necessary for institutional
investors to optimize the vote they cast in their clients’ best interests.
Considering proxy advisory firms in this theoretical framework emphasizes
their importance to the shareholder franchise in a novel way that is divorced
from the self-motivated pronouncements of interested parties.
A. Rational, Efficient Voting and the Delegation of Decision Making
Like shareholder voting, democratic voting has long been the subject of
academic debate centered on its efficiency, utility, or the lack thereof.178 Much
of the negative view of democratic voting hinges on the costs of becoming
sufficiently informed about politics to vote in a manner that is rational and
aligned with one’s preferences; when faced with the costs of becoming
informed and the benefits it brings, voters may rationally choose to remain
ignorant.179 The main cost of becoming informed is that of time: people only

recommendations. . . . [W]hen boards believe that a recommendation has been based on incorrect information,
those recommendations can act as a barrier to boards’ efforts to persuade investors to change their minds.”).
178 See generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 6–21 (1991) (exploring the democratic voting process and rebutting the
presumption that uninformed voters are swayed unfairly by candidates and the media); DONALD A. WITTMAN,
THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 1–6 (1995) (arguing for
the efficiency and utility of democratic institutions despite the widespread belief that economic markets are
considered to be far more efficient).
179 Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic
Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1153 (2003) (“It makes sense to stay uninformed in
light of the high costs of learning more about politics, the low instrumental utility of a single vote, and the
opportunity costs of neglecting life’s other demands.”).
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have so much time available to devote to gathering information and deciding
between alternatives.180
Anthony Downs has broken down the process of voting into seven steps.181
The seven steps are as follows:
1. Gathering information relevant to each issue upon which important
political decisions have been (or will be) made.
2. For each issue, selecting from all the information gathered that
which will be used in the voting decision.
3. For each issue, analyzing the facts selected to arrive at specific
factual conclusions about possible alternative policies and their
consequences.
4. For each issue, appraising the consequences of every likely policy
in light of relevant goals. This is a value appraisal, not a strictly
factual one.
5. Coördinating the appraisals of each issue into a net evaluation of
each party running in the election. This is also a value judgment
personally tailored to the goals of the voter himself.
6. Making the voting decision by comparing the net evaluations of
each party and weighting them for future contingencies.
182
7. Actually voting or abstaining.

Each step of this process has corresponding costs associated with it.183 When a
step is delegated, additional steps are created and added to the process; with
each additional step, there is additional cost, such as the cost of an expert
acquiring information on an issue, or the cost of the expert transmitting the
analysis of an issue to the voter.184
There is a dilemma involved in negotiating the steps of rational voting: not
only are there costs associated with the gathering of data, there are also costs
associated with the parsing of the data so that a voter can decide the “crucial
question” of which information to keep and which to reject.185 The selection
180 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 209 (1957) (“The main scarce resource
consumed . . . is the time . . . .”).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 These costs are broken into “transferable costs,” which can be shifted from the voter onto someone
else, and “nontransferable costs,” which must be borne by the voter. Id. at 210. Transferable costs are further
broken into three sub-costs: “(a) Procurement costs are the costs of gathering, selecting, and transmitting data.
(b) Analysis costs are the costs of making factual analysis of data. (c) Evaluative costs are the costs of relating
data or factual analyses to specific goals.” Id.
184 Downs asserted that steps one through six can all be delegated. Id. at 209.
185 Id. at 211.
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and refinement of which data to use in this process is a much more difficult
assessment than typical decisions people make in their lives.186 Most of the
decisions people are faced with involve present returns and clear alternatives—
e.g., choosing which restaurant to go to or which television to buy.187
However, voting decisions are essentially investments made in the hopes of
future gains.188 Therefore, the analysis and refinement of gathered data is
incredibly important in formulating a rational vote.189 The process of making
voting decisions is complicated by the costs of being fully informed; while a
voter wants to gather as much information as possible, he is limited by the
demands of rationality, which dictate that the voter spend no more time or
money in obtaining the information than would be justified by the returns.190
Voters are thus faced with a common decision: maximizing what they want
(knowledge), while keeping costs down.191 If a voter does not want to simply
reduce the information he receives, Downs suggests two solutions: (1) reduce
the costs of procuring the information, and (2) delegation.192 Reducing the
costs of procurement is done through the use of free and subsidized
information,193 and delegation is employed when the free information on hand
is insufficient.194
Free information is not information that has no cost, but rather information
that is so cheap that there is almost no way to, or purpose in, transferring its
cost.195 In this way, Downs’s definition of free information is fairly
tautological: free information is information that is acquired without needing to
delegate.196 Free information generally is information that is absorbed as a byproduct of voters’ daily activities197: watching television and seeing political
ads and campaigns, reading newspapers, and engaging in conversations with

186

See POPKIN, supra note 178, at 10.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Downs called the question “crucial” because it shapes subsequent decisions and whether they are
effective. DOWNS, supra note 180, at 211.
190 Id. at 227–28.
191 Id. at 228.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 228–29; see POPKIN, supra note 178, at 213.
194 DOWNS, supra note 180, at 228–29; see POPKIN, supra note 178, at 213. There is no real reason to
distinguish between free information and subsidized information because they function in the same way and
have the same weaknesses. DOWNS, supra note 180, at 230.
195 DOWNS, supra note 180, at 222.
196 See id.
197 POPKIN, supra note 178, at 23.
187
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other people.198 Another significant source of free information is heuristic
cues, reliable informational shortcuts such as brand names for products.199 In
the political voting context, the most important heuristic cue is party
affiliation,200 or when evaluating candidates, personal characteristics and
campaign behavior.201
The biggest weakness of free information is that the selection biases of the
information provider are most often different than that of the voter; it is cheap
for that very reason.202 When reading a newspaper article on healthcare for
instance, a voter is at the mercy of what the author thinks is important about
healthcare. A voter has no input in determining what issues the providers of
free information take into account, nor does the voter have the ability to
influence the analysis or conclusions reached.203
When voters want information from sources that are already matched with
their selection preferences, or want to obtain higher quality information than
that from free information sources, they can shift the gathering, analysis, and
even the evaluation of facts to experts through delegation.204 In situations when
the issue at hand is too complex or difficult to understand, rational voters, by
necessity, must rely on experts.205 Crucially, information received from experts
is relatively cheap because of the division of labor and specialization.206
Rational action in the context of voting requires that voters will not expend
more effort and resources in becoming informed than is justified by the returns
available.207 As the process of becoming informed thus becomes a balancing of
costs and benefits, free information would be the first type of information
sought out—if not truly “free,” it carries an almost nominal cost.208 If voters
could become fully informed through free information, they would unerringly
198

See DOWNS, supra note 180, at 229–30.
See Kang, supra note 179, at 1149.
200 Id. at 1150.
201 POPKIN, supra note 178, at 44.
202 DOWNS, supra note 180, at 230 (“[E]ach consumer gains financially only by sacrificing control over
the selection principles behind the information. . . . [T]his sacrifice may completely offset his economic
gain.”).
203 See id.
204 Id. at 231. For the delegation of evaluation to be rational, Downs argued that the “evaluative
delegator” must determine that the delegated agent has similar goals, more data, and powers of judgment that
are good enough to not offset the advantages gained through his possession of superior knowledge. Id. at 232.
205 Id. at 231.
206 Id. at 225, 231.
207 Id. at 227–28.
208 See id. at 222.
199
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choose this path, as it would be the most cost-efficient route. Therefore, voters
delegate when they cannot become sufficiently informed by free information,
implying an inverse relationship between the suitability209 of free information
and the need to delegate.210
The nature of free information yields another conclusion: the more complex
or esoteric an issue is, the less free information there will be available.211 Free
information generally cannot be about complex issues because the definition of
free information necessitates that the information be digestible.212 Complex
issues present “literally incomprehensible problems” to most voters,
necessitating delegation.213 Information about esoteric issues is unlikely to be
disseminated by the traditional sources214 of free information. If a topic is
esoteric, it is unlikely to be discussed at a water cooler, talked about on
television, or otherwise discussed in avenues in which voters come across free
information.215 It follows, therefore, that for issues that are complex or
esoteric, voters are forced to delegate to become sufficiently informed.216
While there are still costs associated with delegation—e.g., paying for the
expert’s services217—the savings are ultimately tremendous and lead to two
important conclusions: (1) rational, political action democracy cannot exist

209 When talking about the “suitability” of free information, the information must contribute to a voter’s
goal of being sufficiently informed for it to count as suitable. See id. at 241. For a piece of free information to
count as suitable, it must contribute to the voter becoming closer to being fully informed. See id. So while
there may be many newspaper articles about an issue, if they do not contribute to the voter becoming
sufficiently informed, there is a lack of suitable free information, despite the quantity. In this sense, free
information can be viewed as points available toward becoming 100% sufficiently informed.
210 Much of this idea is represented in the literature about information shortcuts and heuristic cues. See
generally POPKIN, supra note 178. For example, Popkin asserted that “[a]t the heart of gut rationality are
information shortcuts—easily obtained and used forms of information that serve as ‘second-best’ substitutes
for harder-to-obtain kinds of data.” Id. at 44.
211 See DOWNS, supra note 180, at 230–31.
212 Free information must be easily understood for it to be free information: if a voter cannot understand
the information, there exist transferable costs, which disqualify the information from being free. See id. at 222,
230–31.
213 Id. at 230–31.
214 Traditional sources of free information include: the informal contacts people have with each other,
mass media (e.g., newspapers, television, and radio), and entities with a vested interest in the resolution of the
issue (e.g., political parties and interest groups). Id. at 221–23.
215 But see id. at 222 (noting that esoteric information, such as the President’s Economic Report, can be
free information but will have significantly higher nontransferable costs).
216 Id. at 230–31.
217 The costs for delegation include paying for the analysis and choosing the agent(s) to which to delegate.
Id. at 231–32.
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without the shifting of analysis onto specialists,218 and (2) it may be rational
for a man to delegate all of his political decision making.219 Delegating in the
political process is highly efficient due to the relatively low costs and large
gains to be had.220
B. A Downsian Analysis of Shareholder Voting
Downs’s analysis of the mechanisms of rational, efficient voting can be
easily applied to the shareholder voting process, yielding important insights.
Chief among these insights is that the need for delegation in the shareholder
voting process is even more pronounced, and that the use of proxy advisory
firms is highly efficient and fundamental to the beneficial exercise of the
shareholder vote. Fundamentally, there is no substantive reason to differentiate
between the voting Downs analyzed and the voting done by institutional
investors: while the issues voters are confronted with are different, and the
mechanisms of the vote are not the same, both democratic voting and
shareholder voting involve the collection, analysis, and evaluation of data
based on the voters’ preferences.221
Because there is no salient reason to view voting in a shareholder context
differently than voting in a political process, framing shareholder voting
through a Downsian framework is highly instructive. Analyzing shareholder
voting through the Downsian framework leads to the following conclusions:
(1) there is little free information available about the issues that shareholders
vote on, making it necessary for institutional investors to delegate almost all
aspects of decision making, and (2) the existence and use of proxy advisory
firms allow institutional investors to construct a system of information based
on delegation that leads to a highly efficient shareholder vote.
1. The Lack of Free Information in Shareholder Voting
Almost every aspect of shareholder voting points to a need to delegate. The
issues on corporate proxies are both esoteric and complex, centered on issues
such as: capital structure, auditing, executive compensation, and board
composition.222 Corporate proxies are renowned for their “length and
218

Id. at 231.
Id. at 233.
220 Id. at 231.
221 The seven steps articulated by Downs should apply to all situations when a person is voting.
222 DOMINI SOC. INVS., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES & PROCEDURES 6 (13th ed. 2008), available at
http://www.domini.com/common/pdf/ProxyVotingGuidelines.pdf.
219
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complexity.”223 Institutional investors have portfolios consisting of a
“multitude” of companies;224 large institutional investors can face thousands of
shareholder meetings a year.225 As free information is information that can be
acquired without delegation,226 the preceding arguments demonstrate the lack
of free information available in shareholder voting.
Furthermore, there are not many analogs of the traditional types of heuristic
cues available in democratic voting as in shareholder voting. While director
elections contain candidates, there are no voting cues associated with campaign
behavior, personal characteristics, and relations with people and groups.227
There are no political party equivalents that represent bundled ideologies. The
only readily available heuristic cue for shareholders is the stock price, which
carries with it information concerning the current value of the company and its
overall vitality.228
Ultimately, though, the information that can be gained from the stock price
is materially limited or otherwise insufficient. Critics who argue against
shareholder empowerment seize upon the insufficiency of the stock price as an
informational cue, arguing that “stock prices are not fully informed because of
informational asymmetries enjoyed by managers,” and that stock prices are
subject to manipulation and “speculative factors unrelated to fundamental
value.”229 Focus on stock price as an indicator of overall corporate health has
been blamed for the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, highlighting its lack of
sufficiency as an information provider.230
All told, there is a lack of free information available to allow institutional
investors to be sufficiently informed when making voting decisions. While
223

Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 623.
Belinfanti, supra note 35, at 409.
225 For example, BlackRock claimed that it votes at 14,000 shareholder meetings a year—4,000 of which
are for companies within the United States. Letter from Abe M. Friedman, Managing Dir., BlackRock, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 29, 2010) [hereinafter BlackRock Letter],
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-254.pdf.
226 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
227 POPKIN, supra note 178, at 44.
228 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383 (1970) (describing an efficient market as one in which prices fully reflect available information).
229 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 653, 661 (2010). “[A]s business-policy choices become more complex, the stock price becomes less an
objective report on a particular value outcome and more an input for interpretation.” Id. at 695.
230 Strine, supra note 1, at 1764. The meltdowns of Enron and WorldCom have often been cited as
watershed moments in the rise of institutional activism and proxy advisory firms. See Belinfanti, supra note
35, at 392.
224
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some free information is bound to exist, given the sheer amount of information
that would need to exist and the complexity of corporate proxy materials, it
follows a priori and a fortiori that there is not enough free information for
shareholders to become sufficiently informed. To do so, shareholders must
delegate. In practice, shareholders do actually delegate, further suggesting both
the inadequate amount of free information available and the need to delegate.
2. Delegation in Downs and Proxy Advisory Firms as a System of
Information
Revisiting Downs, a rational decision maker must create “a system of
information acquisition” that: (1) utilizes information that is chosen in
accordance with the voter’s selection principles;231 (2) delivers the relevant
information necessary to make the decision;232 and (3) possesses adequate
internal plurality to function as checks on accuracy and deviation from
selection principles.233 Further, a system of information acquisition predicated
on delegation must have the following characteristics: (a) the selection
principles used by the agent must be aligned with those of the voter; (b) the
goals of the agent should be the same as the voter’s; (c) the agent needs to not
only have more information than the voter, but the agent’s information must be
enough to make the decision;234 and (d) there must be adequate internal
plurality to insure the accuracy of information and selection principles.235
The availability and use of customizable voting policies makes it very
likely that proxy advisory firms choose information that is in accordance with
their clients’ selection principles. In addition to customizable voting policies,
the study of Professors Choi, Fisch, and Kahan indicated that there is
“heterogeneity among proxy advisors.”236 Therefore, not only do institutional
231
232
233
234
235
236

DOWNS, supra note 180, at 213, 218 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 218.
Choi et al., supra note 30, at 696. The authors found that:
Proxy advisors differ significantly from each other in their propensity to issue withhold
recommendations, in the factors on which they base their recommendations, in the weight
accorded to those factors, in their propensity to issue a greater number of withhold
recommendations for persons nominated for multiple board seats, in their proclivity to issue
group-based and spillover recommendations, and in their reasons for doing so.

Id. For a discussion of some of the issues on which proxy advisory firms differ, see Diamond & Yevmenenko,
supra note 113, at 609–14. Some of the primary areas of differentiation are: assessing what constitutes an
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investors retain the ability to customize voting policies, they can choose firms
based on the differences in their “default” position. With regard to point (b)
above, proxy advisory firms do not have to actually share the individual goals
of their clients; rather, proxy advisory firms must use these goals in modeling
their recommendation. A recommendation issued to a client should be based
on, and stem from, a consideration of the voting selections in light of the
client’s stated preferences.
Whether a proxy advisory firm has more information than its client will
vary with every client. For smaller institutional investors that cannot afford to
research matters on their own, proxy advisory firms assuredly possess more
information. For larger clients that have in-house research teams, this may not
be the case. However, this is not necessarily a point against the utility of proxy
advisory firms: Downs made clear that this condition only needs to be true
when the client is relying on the judgment of the agent.237 Therefore, if the
client relies on the judgment of the proxy advisory firm, the tacit admission is
that the proxy advisory firm possesses more information or keener insight.
While the existence of in-house research teams may seem to make proxy
advisory firms redundant or obviate the need for hiring more than one firm,
this practice satisfies the fourth component of a rational system of information.
The fourth component requires that there be sufficient internal plurality within
the system of information capable of providing checks on the accuracy of
information and the selection principles used.238 Using independent sources of
information allows the client to “check” each source against one another.239
This is precisely what is done when an institutional investor hires a proxy
advisory firm to supplement its in-house research staff or the other proxy
advisory firms it may already subscribe to.
As used by large institutional investors, proxy advisory firms satisfy the
four conditions of a rational information system built on delegation. Small
institutional investors that lack in-house research staffs or cannot afford to
subscribe to more than one proxy advisory firm likely lack sufficient internal
plurality or, at the very least, cannot police their system of information as
robustly as large institutional investors. Despite this, a system of information
independent director, the use of predetermined metrics in assessing company performance and executive
compensation, having a standing policy toward say-on-pay or using case-by-case assessments, and how to
incorporate issues of social responsibility. Id.
237 DOWNS, supra note 180, at 232.
238 Id. at 218.
239 Id.
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predicated on the use of proxy advisory firms is still highly efficient and
necessary for institutional investors to rationally cast informed votes on behalf
of their clients.
V. WHAT REGULATION SHOULD LOOK LIKE
When considering possible regulatory frameworks to govern the operation
of proxy advisory firms, the SEC should account for the utility of proxy
advisory firms as efficient, information-gathering agents. As discussed in Part
III, the motivations that underscore the criticisms of the status quo are not
merely overstated,240 but they are actually discredited by how these firms
operate and the diversity of services they provide. To this point, proxy
advisory firms are analogous to experts used in the democratic voting arena
because proxy advisory firms provide customized voting policies that produce
recommendations aligned with shareholder preferences and goals. Application
of the Downsian framework discussed in Part IV to shareholder voting
illustrates the importance of proxy advisory firms to the rational, efficient
exercise of the shareholder franchise.241 In light of these findings, this Part
discusses the SEC’s recent trend toward overregulation and the potential
problems associated therewith. Finally, it proposes regulatory frameworks that
can effectively and responsibly deal with the rational concerns regarding the
proxy advisory industry.
A. The SEC and Regulation
According to then-professor, now-Commissioner Troy Paredes, the SEC’s
approach to securities regulation post-Enron has been aligned with what is
known as “the precautionary principle.”242 The precautionary principle is an
aggressive, prophylactic-minded form of regulation reflecting the SEC’s belief
“that it is better to be safe than sorry.”243 Precautionary regulatory approaches
are more successful at avoiding potential harms but, as a result, are prone to
overregulation.244 The SEC has moved toward the precautionary regulatory
approach due to both internal and external factors.
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Inherent in the nature of the SEC are several cognitive biases and
behavioral influences that naturally push toward overregulation.245 For
instance, the “availability heuristic,” whereby prominent recent events are
more readily available to the mind, causes regulators to “overstate the
probability of some bad recent event occurring again in the future.”246 Given
the massive corporate frauds that have occurred lately, the SEC’s natural
biases have caused it to irrationally focus much of its decision-making
considerations on the costs of not regulating. In this vein, the SEC has
overemphasized the magnitude of these costs and overestimated the likelihood
that similar frauds or scandals will occur again.247
The SEC’s cognitive biases are “exacerbated by the political
imperative,”248 which coupled with increased media scrutiny results in
“excessive” regulations.249 Big scandals and crises cause the SEC to get
heaped with blame, while overly stringent regulations bring about only “mild
criticism[s].”250 Knowing that future scandals will lead to similar criticism and
embarrassment, the SEC has started an aggressive regulatory campaign.251
Compounding the SEC’s tendency to overregulate is the corresponding
difficulty to undo regulations: “Regulations are easy to promulgate but difficult
to remove.”252 The same biases and pressures that cause overregulation can
lead to continuing the regulations. For instance, the confirmation bias may
“prove” that the regulations are working.253 Generally, while regulators can
mitigate overregulation by pulling back on enforcement efforts, overregulation
is “infrequently unwound.”254
B. The Potential Costs of Overregulation
Determining the right course of regulation is always difficult; there are no
bright lines, guideposts, or markers to find the “sweet spot.”255 The question of
245 Id. at 1009–10. For a discussion of the biases within the SEC, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20–36 (2003).
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proper regulation centers on normative beliefs regarding tolerable risks,
combined with assessments of the likelihood of harm and possible benefits.256
By its nature, an assessment of normative beliefs does not yield a “right
answer” to such an inquiry, and, thus, it seems more apropos to discuss the
possible consequences of overregulation based on what is known about how
institutional investors use proxy advisory firms.
As the GAO report indicated, large institutional investors generally have
their own internal research staffs and use proxy advisory firms as information
gatherers to supplement and augment their research.257 In addition to internal
research staff, many large institutional investors subscribe to multiple proxy
advisory firms.258 For example, BlackRock subscribes to three firms.259 The
GAO report noted that small institutional investors are more reliant on proxy
advisory firms because of their limited resources,260 and thus are less likely to
have internal research staffs or the reports of other proxy advisory firms to
compare and check the information and analysis they are provided. It follows
then that small institutional investors are more at risk for whatever potential
harms exist in regard to proxy advisory firms.
The fact that small institutional investors are the ones most at risk for
problems arising from the use of proxy advisory firms is crucial to note, as
many of the proposed regulatory frameworks would work to push the costs of
regulation first onto proxy advisory firms,261 and ultimately onto their
clients.262 These costs are far from insignificant and can be expensive.263 The
more expensive proxy advisory services become, the less likely small
institutional investors could subscribe to more than one proxy advisory firm to
mitigate the influence of any one report using independent sources of
information to “check” each source against one another.264 As small
institutional investors lack the resources to develop their own internal proxy
research staffs, overregulation could have the perverse effect of harming the
most at-risk class of clients.
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In a similar vein, the increased costs of regulation would likely have a
greater effect on smaller proxy advisory firms or new competitors.265
Regulation of the proxy advisory firm industry may simply entrench the
market leaders, specifically ISS, which can withstand the increased costs of
operation and could potentially screen out new entrants.266 Given that ISS is
already registered with the SEC as an investment adviser under the Advisers
Act, regulation centered on forcing all proxy advisory firms to register would
likely just aid ISS and harm competition due to the costs of compliance.267
The GAO report states that the institutional investors it interviewed
believed “that increased competition could help reduce the cost and increase
the range of available proxy advisory services.”268 At present, there is not
much competition in the proxy advisory industry; some have called the level of
competition “anemic.”269 However, BlackRock has remarked that the quality
of research has improved in recent years, which it attributes to market
discipline.270 Overly costly regulations could possibly harm the ability of
institutional investors to “vote with their feet.”271
Due to the nature of the proxy advisory industry and how institutional
investors use proxy advisory firms, the costs of most of the suggested
regulations seem to be ill equipped to ameliorate the concerns voiced by those
who want regulation of the industry. Overregulation would likely harm the
most at-risk clients of proxy advisory firms, entrench ISS’s position as the
market leader, and harm competition. When combined with the findings of Part
III (that the fears motivating regulation of proxy advisory firms are overstated),
Part IV (that proxy advisory firms are critical to the shareholder franchise), and
the SEC’s recent trend toward overregulation, it follows that the regulation of
proxy advisory firms should be constructed with much care and designed to
ensure the overall health of the industry, “instead of imposing mandatory onesize-fits-all requirements as it almost always does.”272
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C. Proposals and Goals for Regulation
Regulations for proxy advisory firms should be tailored to complement the
role proxy advisory firms play in the shareholder franchise, keeping in mind
that costly and overly stringent requirements may ultimately harm those most
affected by proxy advisory firms. Reform of the proxy system should therefore
address the real problems inherent in the status quo and disregard the phantom
issues and uncorroborated rhetoric of critics. Thus, to address the concerns
relating to financial conflicts of interest, Congress can amend Rule 14a-2(b)(3)
to remove the exclusion for proxy advisory firms, which would require that
proxy advisory firms disclose significant relationships with issuers. At the
same time, the SEC should provide explicit guidance concerning the fiduciary
duties owed by institutional investors to their clients when voting their proxies,
particularly addressing the use of proxy advisory recommendations in relation
to institutional investors’ due diligence and independent judgment obligations.
Lastly, and less preferably, Congress may amend the Advisers Act to allow
registration by all proxy advisory firms regardless of size, without making
registration mandatory. Rather than recommend a stock solution to the
concerns at hand—mandatory registration and onerous disclosure
requirements—the SEC can use a piecemeal approach to evenhandedly address
the rational concerns discussed in this Comment.
1. Amending Rule 14a-2(b)(3)
Amending Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to mandate that all proxy advisory firms
disclose any “significant” relationships with an issuer would yield increased
disclosure of potential conflicts of interests without causing significant
corresponding costs. Glass Lewis is in favor of this measure, and notes that it
is not likely to be so onerous a requirement as to prevent new entrants into the
market.273 This form of regulation would be less costly than registration under
the Advisers Act, which would necessarily require more onerous compliance
measures without redeemable assurance of results.274 Also, bearing in mind
that ISS continues to receive heavy criticism notwithstanding that it is the only
major proxy advisory firm currently registered under the Advisers Act, it
stands to argue that forcing all proxy advisory firms to register as investment
advisers under the Advisers Act is simply too costly to be reasonably justified.
Amending Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to govern proxy advisory firms and address
273
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hidden or undisclosed conflicts of interest bridges the gap between the status
quo and a regime of costly regulation under the Advisers Act.
2. Clarifying Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Duty to Vote in the Best
Interests of Their Clients
By clarifying the fiduciary duty institutional investors have to vote in the
best interests of their clients, the SEC can employ a flexible approach that
addresses relevant concerns without subjecting proxy advisory firms to costly
registration. The guidelines could provide that the mere hiring of a proxy
advisory firm is insufficient to satisfy fiduciary obligations, and further that
institutional investors must exercise some level of due diligence when
subscribing to a proxy advisory firm’s voting recommendations. Providing
explicit guidelines concerning fiduciary obligations and liability would likely
open a dialogue between institutional investors and proxy advisory firms, and
it would induce institutional investors to investigate and confirm that the
services they are paying for ultimately satisfy their fiduciary obligations and
that the recommendations they follow are in the best interest of their clients.
While this practice will impose some additional costs on institutional investors,
it could be accomplished without forcing proxy advisory firms to provide
expensive disclosures mandated under the Advisers Act that may have
questionable utility.275 Pursuant to this, the SEC could then require institutional
investors to file an annual statement explaining which firms they have hired,
why they hired those firms, and any additional steps that they have taken to
ensure that they are voting in their client’s best interest.
3. Nonmandatory Advisers Act Registration
Rather than forcing all proxy advisory firms to register as investment
advisers under the Advisers Act, the SEC could amend the Act to allow proxy
advisory firms to register without making it mandatory. This would allow
institutional investors to pressure unregistered proxy advisory firms to register
only if they valued it.276 This kind of “default rule” allows for flexibility: It lets
“parties . . . contract around the law to order their affairs to fit their particular

275 Glass Lewis Letter, supra note 168 (“[M]any of the requirements for registered investment advisers
are not pertinent to proxy advisors and therefore neither the exercise of complying with the registration nor the
registration itself would have great utility to institutional investor clients.”).
276 Paredes, supra note 242, at 993–94 (noting that because complying with the Advisers Act is costly,
registration could show that those who register are more honest).
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needs and preferences.”277 This solution was conceived by Commissioner
Paredes in 2006, when hedge funds became the targets of regulatory reform
talk, as an alternative to mandatory registration as investment advisers.278 This
is an imperfect solution given the gap between the number of hedge funds,
around 8,000 in 2006 when Commissioner Paredes proposed this idea, and the
number of proxy advisory firms—there are essentially three broad-based proxy
advisory firms in ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan Jones, and then a few additional
niche firms.279 Coupled with the vast resources of large institutional investors,
it is possible that the large institutional investors could push for proxy advisory
firms to register under the Advisers Act, as they are in a better position to bear
the cost of compliance. The gulf in resources between large institutional
investors and small institutional investors could expose small institutional
investors who would be more sensitive to a shift in costs. This solution is still
preferable to mandatory registration because it allows market factors to
influence the decision to register. If institutional investors attach value to the
disclosures mandated under the Act—in other words, the disclosures are
useful—then proxy advisory firms and new market entrants would register to
fulfill their needs. However, given the paucity of firms and the scarcity of
competition, this is not particularly desirable because proxy advisory firms
would just cater to large institutional investors, leaving small investors—the
most at-risk clients—to bear the costs of market influences.
D. Final Thoughts on Regulation
A combination of amending Rule 14a-2(b)(3) and expounding upon the
fiduciary duty of institutional investors is a potential regulatory framework that
adequately addresses the conflicts-of-interest issue and clarifies the duties of
institutional investors without imposing the significant costs of formal
registration under the Advisers Act or the disclosure of the data, reasoning, and
methodologies used in formulating voting recommendations. However, this
framework should not be read as an exhaustive list of the possible ways by
which proxy advisory firms can and should be regulated. An approach that is
flexible and mindful of the important role proxy advisory firms play in the
shareholder franchise, and one that accounts for the likelihood that
overregulation may damage the most sensitive clients of proxy advisory firms,
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would likely be satisfactory. The first steps of regulation need not be the final
steps; it is always possible to add more regulations in light of new
developments or a lack of efficacy of the initial efforts.
CONCLUSION
Proxy advisory firms will be overregulated if they are regulated based
solely on the views and recommendations of their critics. The concerns of the
critics of proxy advisory firms are overstated and distort how proxy advisory
firms function and are used by their clients. Proxy advisory firms serve a very
important function in facilitating the rational, efficient exercise of the
shareholder franchise. In light of this, and considering the SEC’s recent
tendency to overregulate (and the likely consequences of overregulation), it is
crucial for the SEC to fully inform itself of the issues this Comment discusses.
The regulatory framework proposed in this Comment has several advantages
over the most prominent approaches that have been suggested because it
addresses the true issues inherent in the proxy advisory industry and accounts
for the utility of proxy advisory firms. In this manner, this framework should
successfully provide for federal oversight without imposing burdensome costs.
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